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Abstract—Many applications involve agents sharing a resource,
such as networks or services. When agents are honest, the system
functions well and there is a net profit. Unfortunately, some
agents may be malicious, but it may be hard to detect them. We
consider the intrusion response problem of how to permanently
blacklist agents, in order to maximise expected profit. This is
not trivial, as blacklisting may erroneously expel honest agents.
Conversely, while we gain information by allowing an agent
to remain, we may incur a cost due to malicious behaviour.
We present an efficient algorithm (HIPER) for making near-
optimal decisions for this problem. Additionally, we derive three
algorithms by reducing the problem to a Markov decision process
(MDP). Theoretically, we show that HIPER is near-optimal.
Experimentally, its performance is close to that of the full MDP
solution, when the (stronger) requirements of the latter are met.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the decision making problem of blacklisting
potentially malicious nodes or agents that share a resource or
network based on partial information. As motivation, consider
a communication network which is monitored by a network
management system. Nodes can be of one of two types:
malicious (e.g. dropping or corrupting packets, creating un-
due congestion), or honest. At each time-step (e.g. reporting
period), we get a set of readings, giving some information
about the behaviour of each node during that period. We want
to optimally decide whether to blacklist a node, or maintain
it in the system for one more time-step.
In order to make the problem non-trivial, we assume that
for every honest node in the network, we have some fixed
tangible gain at each time period. This would be the case, if
all participation was done through a subscription model as in
internet service providers (ISPs). On the other hand, we incur
a (hidden) cost for each malicious node that participates. Thus,
it is in our interests to kick out malicious nodes as soon as
possible, but never to expel honest ones.
We should emphasize that this is not an intrusion detection
problem. In fact, the readings that we obtain for each node
could be seen as the output of some intrusion detection system
(IDS). Rather, we are more concerned about the decision mak-
ing aspect: what is the optimal response to the IDS outputs,
given assumptions about the cost of malicious behaviour?
This setting of keeping suspicious nodes in the network
until we become more certain about their type appears in
many applications such as: 1) blacklisting clients of an ISP
2) shutting down malware-infected hosts in an internal network
3) expelling selfish nodes from a peer-to-peer network. In all
of the above cases, any single piece of information is not
enough to condemn a node to blacklisting. Rather, a sufficient
amount of statistics has to be collected before we are sure
that removing a node is more beneficial than keeping it. In
this paper, we propose and consider a number of algorithms
for tackling this problem in a general setting.
More precisely, our first contribution is a decision-theoretic
approach based on distribution-free high probability bounds.
The bounds require very little prior information and can be
used to trade off the cost of removing honest nodes with that
of keeping malicious nodes in the network for too long. We
prove that this High Probability Efficient Response algorithm
(HIPER) has low worst-case expected loss relative to an oracle
which knows the type of every node.
Our second contribution is a set of Bayesian decision-
theoretic approaches that we derive by formalising the problem
as a Markov decision process (MDP). These require some fur-
ther assumptions. In particular, it is necessary to fully specify
a structure and prior parameters for the underlying statistical
model. In addition, making optimal decisions according to
such models is computationally intractable. Consequently, we
consider some approximate algorithms. Of these, an optimistic
approximation has similar performance to that of HIPER,
while a finite lookahead approximation has increased perfor-
mance, at the cost of additional computation.
The paper is organised as follows. In the remainder of
this section we give some background, present related work
and our contributions. Section II introduces notation while
Section III specifies the loss model. Section IV presents the
proposed HIPER algorithm as well as the bounds on the worst-
case expected loss. Section V describes the decision-theoretic
approaches which model the problem as an MDP and are used
in the performance comparisons with the HIPER algorithm
while Section VI describes the evaluation experiments. Finally,
Section VII concludes the paper. The appendix provides proofs
of technical lemmas and some useful auxiliary results.
A. Background
The problem we consider falls within decision theory. In
particular, the scenario we investigate can be reduced to the
optimal stopping problem [7], which can be modelled as an
MDP [7] or as a (potentially unknown) partially observable
MDP (POMDP) [18].
2More precisely, in our setting, the nodes can be one of
two types: honest or malicious. However, we initially start
out without knowing what type each node is. Consequently,
we must gather data (observations) to reduce our uncertainty
about their types. Unfortunately, we can only do so while
a node remains within the network. However, the longer we
maintain a malicious node in the network, the more loss we
incur. Conversely, once we remove an honest node, we will
obtain no more profit from it. So, the problem can be reduced
to deciding at what time, or under which conditions, to remove
a given node from the network, if at all. Thus, our scenario
can be seen as a type of optimal stopping problem.
The stopping problem has been extensively studied in
general [7], while partial monitoring games in general have
also received a lot of attention recently [6]. However, to the
best of our knowledge, the general hidden reward stopping
problem has not been previously studied in the literature. On
the other hand, the specific application we consider can be
seen as a type of optimal intrusion response.
Most of the previous research on intrusion response has
concentrated on the POMDP formalism. Indicative publica-
tions are those by Zonouz et al. [22], Zan et al., [20] and
Zhang et al. [21], which have all proposed an intrusion
response through modelling the process as a POMDP [18].
More precisely, Zonouz et al. [22] proposed a Response and
Recovery Engine (RRE) based on a game-theoretic response
strategy against adversaries modelled as opponents in a non-
zero-sum, two-player Stackelberg stochastic game. In each
step of the game RRE chooses the response actions using an
approximate POMDP solver. More precisely, using the most
likely state (MLS) [5] approximation, the POMDP is converted
to a competitive Markov Decision Process (MDP), which
is then solved using a look ahead search (i.e. approximate
planning). Zhang et al. use the POMDP to integrate low level
IDS alerts with high level system states, while Zan et. al.
[20] propose to solve the intrusion response problem as a
factored POMDP model. Additionally, they decompose the
POMDP into small sub-POMDPs and compute the response
policy using the MLS approximation technique. However, in
our case MLS as an approximation is too crude to be used,
since it would essentially result in a completely random policy,
as there are only two possible hidden states each node can be
in. An entirely different approach, policy-gradient methods, is
employed by [8] in the context of combating denial-of-service
attacks in P2P networks. However, this approach requires
observing the rewards, which are in fact hidden in our case.
B. Our contributions
Our first proposed algorithm relies on bounds which do not
require knowledge of prior probabilities regarding the type of
a node (honest or malicious) neither known distributions for
the observations corresponding to honest or malicious nodes.
We only need to know the mean of each of these distributions.
Consequently, it is substantially more lightweight than MDP
solvers, since we take decisions without performing explicit
planning. Thus, it is more suitable for resource constrained
environments. We analyse the expected loss of this algorithm,
and show that it is not significantly worse to that of an oracle
which already knows each node’s type.
Our second contribution is to derive three approximate MDP
solvers. In contrast to previous work, in our scenario the
reward is never observed by the algorithm.1 This corresponds
to reality, since we frequently do not know which nodes
give us negative rewards.2 Furthermore, two of our MDP
algorithms are different from those previously employed in the
intrusion response literature, as we forego the most-likely-state
approximation commonly used in POMDP approaches. We
first consider a myopic approximation.3 The second approach
is a lightweight optimistic approximation that performs no
planning, which is derived from upper bounds [9] on Bayesian
decision making in unknown MDPs [11]. To our knowledge,
this approach has not been used in similar problems before. Fi-
nally, we consider online planning with finite lookahead [15],
[7]. This approach takes decisions which consider the impact
of all our possible future actions up to some horizon. This
approach has been employed in other applications such as
dialogue modelling [4], autonomous underwater vehicle map-
ping [16], preference elicitation [2] and sensor scheduling [12]
in wireless sensor networks.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We consider a set of nodes, which can be either honest or
malicious. We assume there is a reliable way to obtain statistics
from each node, such as an IDS that gives us a numerical
score for each node. We denote by Q the set of all malicious
nodes and by U the set of all honest nodes. We consider that
there is an entity E (for instance an Internet Service Provider
(ISP) or a network administrator) who gains some reward gU
for each moment that an honest node remains in the network
and has a cost ℓQ for each moment that a malicious node
stays in the network. A node may be removed by E at any
time, for example through black-listing. However, re-inserting
a removed node is not normally possible.
We use N to denote the (possibly random) time at which E
removes a node from the network. In addition, any honest node
may leave the network at some (random) time H . Specifically,
we assume that an honest node may decide to leave the
network with some small probability λ > 0, independently
over time. Then it holds that E[H ] = 1λ .
Assumption 1: We assume that each node has a fixed type
(i.e. honest or malicious) that is not changing over time. The
type is hidden from E .
This does not mean that a node cannot behave maliciously
during one period and honestly the next: a node that drops
packets on purpose, might not do so all the time. Of course,
E not only does not know the type of each node, but it also
never observes the rewards obtained or the cost incurred.
1Although of course the reward is used in the experiments to measure
performance.
2Conversely, if we could observe the rewards, it would be trivial to identify
malicious nodes.
3This is equivalent to the most likely state approximation and to a sequential
probability ratio test under some conditions.
3At each time-step t and for each node i, E receives an
information signal xi,t ∈ [0, 1], characterising the behaviour of
that node i within the time interval t ∈ N. This signal can be
seen as the output from some IDS, summarising the behaviour
of that node during that period.
Assumption 2: We assume that xi,1, . . . , xi,t are indepen-
dent, (but not identically) distributed, random variables and:
E[xi,t | Q] = q, E[xi,t | U ] = u. (1)
While the expected value is constant for all t, the observed
average of 1t
∑t
k=1 xi,t for each node i will initially be far
from the expected value for small t. The average, together
with the total number of observations for each node form
a summary of the information received by each node. The
relationship between these quantities will be looked at more
closely in the analysis.
Finally, we place no specific meaning to q and u in
this work, as they are application-dependent. In an intrusion
response scenario (e.g. [13]), they could be considered as the
detection rate (DR) and the false alarm rate (FA) correspond-
ingly of an employed intrusion detection system. Then xi,t
would correspond to alarm signals, with lower and high values
for innocent-looking and suspicious behaviour respectively.
Correspodingly, in a peer-to-peer scenario (e.g. [17]), they
could be fairness or reputation scores of each node.
In the remainder, we always refer to some arbitrary node
in the network and thus make no distinction between nodes.
This is because the algorithms that we examine, consider
each node independently of the others. Consequently, the
following section analyses the expected loss for a single node
of unknown type.
III. THE LOSS MODEL
As previously mentioned, E obtains a small gain for each
time-step an honest node is within the network, and a small
loss for each time-step a malicious node remains in the
network. Formally, we can write that the total gain G we obtain
from some node i, which E removes at time N , and which
would voluntarily leave at time H is:
G(i,H,N) =
{
−NℓQ, i ∈ Q
min{H,N}gU , i ∈ U .
(2)
E wants to choose some node removal policy π that maximises
his total expected gain. That means that E needs to keep as
many as possible honest nodes in the network and eliminate
the nodes that behave maliciously. In our analysis, we compare
the expected gain of our policy π with that of an oracle. The
oracle always knows the type of each node (i.e. honest or
malicious), and thus, employs the optimal policy π∗. For i ∈
Q, according to the optimal policy π∗ it holds N = 0, while
for i ∈ U according to the optimal policy π∗ it is N = ∞.
Correspondingly,
Eπ∗ [G(i)] =
{
0, i ∈ Q
E[H ]gU , i ∈ U .
(3)
Let the loss L be the difference between the gain of the optimal
policy and our policy. In particular, the expected loss of policy
π for a node of type v is defined as:
Eπ[L | v] = Eπ∗(v)[G | v]− Eπ[G | v], (4)
where the i subscript has been dropped for simplicity. The
expected loss is bounded by the worst-case expected loss:
Eπ[L] ≤ max
v∈{Q,U}
Eπ[L | v], (5)
which we wish to minimise. If E removes node i from the
network at random time N , then he does not receive any more
observations xi,t for this node from the IDS. Thus, in essence,
we want to find a stopping rule, that will let E to determine
the random time N at which stopping occurs, i.e. E takes the
decision that i ∈ Q and removes it from the network. We note
that, 0 ≤ N ≤ ∞, where N =∞ if stopping never occurs.
Since E does not know if node i is honest or malicious,
it must collect a sufficient number of samples so as to only
remove nodes for which it is reasonably certain that they
are malicious. On the other hand, malicious nodes must be
removed as soon as possible, since the operator incurs a
cost for every moment they remain in the network. The first
algorithm we consider uses simple statistics to make nearly
optimal decisions about which nodes to keep.
IV. THE HIPER ALGORITHM
The algorithm, depicted in Alg. 1, uses the knowledge we
have about malicious and honest nodes (see equation 1). This
is done by calculating the average of all the observations
generated by a node i until time t:
θt ,
1
t
t∑
k=1
xi,k, (6)
and adding an appropriate confidence interval so that errors are
made with low probability. Informally, HIPER keeps nodes in
the network as long as the statistic θt is sufficiently far from
the expected statistic q of malicious nodes. In order to avoid
throwing away honest nodes prematurely, it always keeps
nodes for a certain number of steps to obtain more reliable
statistics. However, as time passes, it needs more and more
evidence to kick a node out. Consequently, the probability
that an honest node is thrown out is bounded.
The analysis of the algorithm proceeds in three steps. First,
we calculate the expected loss of the algorithm when faced
with a node of malicious type. Then, we calculate the loss for
honest nodes. Subsequently, we combine the two losses and
tune the algorithm’s input parameters to obtain an overall loss
bound.
The first bound only depends upon the input parameter
δ, the error probability we wish to accept, and the loss ℓQ
incurred by malicious nodes. We prove that the expected loss
is polynomially bounded in terms of both δ and ℓQ.
Lemma 1: For Algorithm 1, with input parameter δ, and
∆ = |u− q|, the expected loss when the node is malicious is
4Algorithm 1 HIPER Algorithm for Optimal Response
Parameters: δ,∆, q ∈ [0, 1]
Loop: For each node i in the network:
For each time-step t do:
if |θt − q| <
√
ln(2/δ)
2t and t >
ln(2/δ)
2∆2 then
remove node i from the network
else keep node i in the network.
end if
end For
end For
bounded as:
E[L | Q] ≤ ℓQ
(1 − δ)2 (7)
The proof of this lemma can be found in the appendix.
Naturally, the expected loss is linearly dependent on the loss of
keeping a malicious node in the network, while the dependence
on the error probability is quadratic.
The second bound depends on the input parameter ∆, which
corresponds to how far we expect the statistics of honest nodes
to be from q, the gain obtained by honest nodes gU and the
leaving probability of honest nodes λ. Once more, we obtain
a polynomial loss bound in terms of those variables.
Lemma 2: If ∆ = |u− q|, then the expected loss when the
node is honest is bounded by:
E[L | U ] ≤ gU(∆
2 + 2)
λ(∆2 + 2λ)
. (8)
The proof of this lemma can be found in the appendix.
Similarly to the previous lemma, there is a linear dependence
on the loss that is incurred when we erroneously remove
an honest node, and a quadratic dependence on the rate of
departure. In addition, there is a weak dependence on the gap
∆ between the two means.
Finally, we can combine everything in one bound by select-
ing a value for δ that depends on ∆ and which simultaneously
makes the bounds tight:
Theorem 1: Set ∆ = |u− q| and select:
δ = 1−
√
ℓQλ(∆2 + 2λ)
gU(∆2 + 2)
(9)
then the expected loss EL is bounded by:
E(L) ≤ L1 , gU(∆
2 + 2)
λ(∆2 + 2λ)
. (10)
Proof: If we substitute (9) in (4) we get:
E[L|Q] ≤ ℓQ
(1 − δ)2 =
ℓQ
ℓQλ(∆2+2λ)
gU (∆2+2)
=
gU(∆2 + 2)
λ(∆2 + 2λ)
. (11)
Thus, using (5) and Lemmas 1 and 2 we get:
E(L) ≤ gU(∆
2 + 2)
λ(∆2 + 2λ)
This theorem shows that the performance of HIPER only very
weakly depends on the gap ∆ between honest and malicious
nodes. In addition, it is optimal up to a polynomial factor.
V. MARKOV DECISION PROCESS APPROXIMATIONS
As mentioned in the introduction, our setting corresponds
to an optimal stopping problems. As these can be modelled
as MDPs [7], it may be useful to solve the problem directly
using the MDP formalism.
To cast our problem in this setting, we need to specify: a)
the prior probability for each node being honest or malicious;
b) a known distribution family for the observation distribution,
conditioned on whether the node under consideration is honest
or malicious; c) a planning algorithm for calculating our
responses. This can be quite demanding computationally, as
the solution to the problem requires planning in a large tree.
However, they can result in much better performance.
A. Intrusion Response and POMDP
A Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP)
[18] is a generalisation of a Markov Decision Process (MDP).
More precisely, a POMDP models the relationship between
an agent and its environment when the agent cannot directly
observe the underlying state. A POMDP can be described as a
tuple < S,A,O, T,Ω, R > where S is a finite set of states, A
is a set of possible actions, O is a set of possible observations,
T is a set of conditional transition probabilities and Ω is a set
of conditional observation probabilities and R : A,S → R.
We can model our intrusion response problem as a POMDP
if we consider that a node of the network at each time-step t
has a state st ∈ S with st = (vt, ct) where vt ∈ {0, 1} and
ct ∈ {0, 1} such that:
vt =
{
0, if the node is honest,
1, if the node is malicious.
ct =
{
0, if the node is in the network,
1, if the node is out of the network.
where it holds that P(vt+1 = vt) = 1 since vt is stationary
(i.e. a malicious node is always malicious and an honest node
remains honest) based on Assumption 1.
Additionally, at each time-step t, E can perform an action
at ∈ {0, 1} such that:
at =
{
0, if E keeps the node in the network,
1, if E removes the node from the network.
Furthermore, the following independence condition holds:
P(vt+1 | vt, ct, at) = P(vt+1 | vt) since the type of a node
(i.e. malicious or honest) does not depend on E’s action (i.e.
remove from the network or not) neither on whether the node
is in the network or out. In addition, since the type of a node
never changes, it holds:
P(vt+1 = j | vt = j) = 1. (12)
5Consequently, we remove the time subscript from v in the
sequel. On the other hand the probability that a node will be
in the network depends on if it is already in or out and the
action that E will take:
P(ct+1 | ct, v, at) = P(ct+1 | ct, at) (13)
From equations (12) and (13), it is evident that the POMDP
under consideration is factored.
To fully specify the model we must assume some probability
distribution for the observations. Specifically, we model xt as
drawn from a Bernoulli distribution4 with parameters u and q
for honest and malicious nodes respectively: P(xt = 1 | v =
0) = u and P(xt = 1 | v = 1) = q. Let xt , (x1, . . . , xt)
be a t-length sequence of observations. From Bayes’ theorem,
we obtain an expression for our belief at time t:
P(v = j | xt) = P(xt | v = j)P(v = j)∑1
i=0 P(xt | v = i)P(v = i)
(14)
where j ∈ {0, 1}. Thus, the expected gain at time t if E
decides to keep a node in the network is: E[Gt | ct = 0,xt] =
P(v = 0 | xt) · gU − P(v = 1 | xt) · ℓQ while the expected
gain if E decides to remove the node from the network is
always: E[Gt | ct = 1] = 0. The problem is to find a policy
π : X∗ → A, mapping from the set of all possible sequences
of observations to actions, maximising the total expected gain:
Eπ(G) = Eπ
( ∞∑
t=1
Gt
)
. (15)
Since future gains depend on any future observations we might
obtain, the exact calculation requires enumerating all possible
future observations. Consequently, the exact solution to the
problem is intractable [7], [11], [9]. In the next section we
describe possible approximations to this problem.
B. POMDP algorithms
We consider three algorithms: a) A myopic algorithm, which
only considers the expected gain at the current time-step; b)
An optimistic algorithm, which computes an upper bound
on the total expected gain; c) A finite lookahead algorithm,
which performs complete planning up to some fixed finite
depth. While these algorithms have appeared before in the
general MDP literature, they have not been applied before
to intrusion response problems. We do not consider the most
likely state approximation (MLS), since in our case there are
only two possible hidden states for a node, thus, rendering the
approximation far too coarse for it to be effective.
1) Myopic: In this case, E only considers the expected gain
for the next time-step when taking a decision. Consequently,
E keeps the node in the network if: E[Gt | at = 0] >
E[Gt | at = 1]. This algorithm is the closest to the MLS
approximation among the ones considered. In fact, it is easy to
see that it would be identical to MLS, as well as to a sequential
probability ratio test, when ℓQ = gU .
4This distribution is particularly convenient for computational reasons,
because closed-form Bayesian inference can be performed via the Beta
conjugate prior [7]. However, in principle it can be replaced with any other
distribution family, without affecting the overall formalism.
2) Optimistic: This rule constructs an upper bound on the
value of the decision to keep a node in the network, which
is based on Proposition 1 in [9]. Informally, this is done by
assuming that the true type of the node will be revealed at the
next time-step. Then E keeps the node in the network if and
only if: P(vt = 0 | xt)·gU/λ > P(vt = 1 | xt)·ℓQ. Intuitively,
if the node is revealed to be malicious, then we can remove
it at the next step and consequently we only lose ℓQ. In the
converse case, we can keep it for an expected 1/λ steps.
3) Finite lookahead: The finite lookahead algorithm per-
forms backwards induction [7] up to some finite depth T , at
every time-step. More precisely, any sequence of observations
xt = (x1, . . . , xt) results in a posterior probability P(vt | xt).
Let: Vt ,
∑∞
k=tGk be the total gain starting from time-step t.
Then, the expected gain under the optimal policy is determined
recursively as follows:
E(Vt | xt) = max{0,E(Gt | xt, at = 0) + E(Vt+1 | xt)}
E(Vt+1 | xt) = pt E(Gt | xt, xt+1 = 1)+
(1− pt)E(Vt+1 | xt, xt+1 = 0)
where pt , P(xt+1 = 1 | xt) =
∑1
i=0 P(xt+1 = 1 |
v = i)P(v = i | xt) is the marginal posterior probability
that xt+1 = 1. For more details on this backwards induction
algorithm, the reader is urged to consult [7], [11].
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We perform three sets of experiments. The first set in-
vestigates the performance of HIPER with various choices
of the parameter δ, including the optimal choice suggested
by Theorem 1. The second set compares HIPER with the
myopic and optimistic approximations. In the final set of
experiments, we compare the optimistic with the finite looka-
head approximation. In all cases, we collected results from
104 runs, with 100 nodes in each simulation, and we plot
a moving average of the expected loss as various network
parameters change. Specifically, the first results we report (i.e.
Fig. 1) are made through 104 experiments. For each exper-
iment, we selected a horizon H ∼ Uniform([10, 1000]),
user and adversary parameters u, q ∼ Uniform([0, 1]), and
user gain gU ∼ Uniform([0, 1]) and we set ℓQ = 1. Each
experiment measured the loss for a network containing 100
nodes, each of which had a probability p of being malicious,
with p ∼ Beta(2, 2) for each experiment. During each run,
the i-th node generates a sequence of observations xi,t drawn
from a Bernoulli distribution with parameter u if the node
is honest and q if the node is malicious. Figure 1 shows a
summary of the results, averaged over these trials. It can be
seen that, while HIPER’s performance is relatively robust to
the choice of δ, nevertheless the optimal choice suggested by
Theorem 1 generally leads to small losses.
For our second set of experiments, shown in Figure 2, we
compare HIPER with the optimistic and myopic algorithms.
We increased the range of user gains to gU ∼ Uniform([0, 2])
compared to the previous setup, but the other experimental
parameters remain the same. It is clear that the myopic
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Fig. 1. Simulations with Alg. 1, for four different choices of δ. In particular δ1 = 0.9, δ2 = 0.95, δ3 = 0.99 and δ∗ is chosen according to Theorem 1. It
can be seen that, while the algorithm is not extremely sensitive to the exact choice of δ, the optimal value is generally more robust.
approximation has almost always a higher loss compared to
both HIPER and the optimistic algorithm. The latter, while
performing at a similar level to HIPER, has an advantage
when either the proportion of malicious is small or when gU
is large. This makes sense intuitively, since in those cases
the optimism is justified. In the converse case, however, the
optimistic approach performs worse than HIPER, which is
less sensitive to the proportion of malicious nodes, since it is
a worst-case approach.
Finally, we performed some experiments comparing the
optimistic approximation with the finite-lookahead POMDP
solvers for lookahead for T time-steps where T ∈ {4, 8}.
While these do not solve the problem to the end of the
horizon H , they plan ahead for T steps at every time-step
of the simulation. Unfortunately, the complexity of these
solvers is exponential in T , which limited the amount of
simulations we could perform to 103 and we only consid-
ered horizons H ∼ Uniform([1, 100]). These experiments
are shown in Fig. 3. In comparison with Fig. 2, the finite
lookahead algorithms performs much better than the myopic
approximation and indeed the 8-step lookahead manages to
slightly outperform the optimistic approximation. In addition,
it is much more robust to the proportion of malicious nodes
in the network. However, the relative advantage of the 8-step
to the 4-step lookahead is relatively small for the amount of
extra computation required.5
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper defined a resource management problem
that arises frequently in communication networks. Namely,
whether to remove a suspicious node from the system, with
the amount of available evidence, or to collect some further
data before taking the final decision. This is in fact a type
of stopping problem, which we believe is of relevance to
many applications where blacklisting may be performed. This
includes applications such as automated intrusion response,
as well as ensuring fairness in peer-to-peer networks, such
as [19]. To this end, we proposed and analysed, both theoret-
ically and experimentally, an efficient algorithm, HIPER, that
achieves low worst-case expected loss relative to an oracle
that knows a priori the type (honest or malicious) of every
5The computational effort is exponential in T .
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Fig. 2. Comparison of HIPER with the myopic solver and the optimistic approximation for various network conditions. It can be clearly seen that the
myopic approximation is significantly worse than both approaches. However, the optimistic approach outperforms the worst-case HIPER algorithm when the
proportion of malicious nodes is low. The optimistic approach is also better when the payment for honest nodes is high.
node in the system. In addition, we derived and compared a
number of algorithms by modelling the problem as a POMDP:
a myopic and an optimistic approximation, as well as a finite
lookahead solver. Of those, the optimistic approximation and
the partial finite lookahead solvers perform the best, with
the finite lookahead methods being the most robust, while
simultaneously being computationally demanding.
The main advantage of HIPER are its simplicity and lack
of stringent assumptions on the distribution. This makes it
suitable for deployment in most situations. However, whenever
a full probabilistic model and computational resources are
available, one of the approximate solvers would be useful.
The overall best performance is offered by the finite looka-
head, closely followed by the optimistic approximation. The
myopic approximation, which is equivalent to the widely-used
“most likely state” (MLS) approximation, is the worst. To
our knowledge, neither the optimistic approximation, nor the
finite lookahead methods have been applied before to this
problem or more generally to intrusion response problems.
They should be more generally applicable for other types
of intrusion response and resource management problems.
It is our view that they are inherently more suitable than
other approximations such as the commonly used (MLS)
approximation (or equivalently, a sequential probability ratio
test) which in our setting produces an essentially random
policy.
For future work, we would like to extend our theoretical
analysis to the performance of the optimistic and the finite
lookahead algorithms. In addition, it would be interesting
to examine a more general game-theoretic scenarios, includ-
ing strategic attackers [1], [10]. Finally, we would like to
generalise our setting so that observations must be explicitly
gathered from each node, where it is not possible to continu-
ously sample all nodes due to budget constraints. In fact, the
sampling problem in the context of intrusion detection, has
been recently studied by [14], [3]. A natural extension of our
work would consequently be to optimally combine sampling
and response policies.
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Fig. 3. Comparison of the optimistic approximation with approximate non-myopic POMDP solvers for planning lookahead of T time-steps where T ∈ {4, 8}.
It can be seen that, for short horizons, these perform just as well and that they are more robust to the proportion of malicious nodes in the network. However,
these methods are computationally more intensive, with complexity O(eT ).
APPENDIX
This section collects the missing proofs from the main text.
(Lemma 1): Since the node i under consideration is
malicious, i.e. i ∈ Q, it holds that: E[xi,t | Q] = q. Then,
we have:
E[θt | Q] = E
[
1
t
·
t∑
k=1
xi,k
∣∣∣∣Q
]
=
1
t
t∑
k=1
E[xi,k | Q] = 1
t
·t·q = q.
From Hoeffding’s inequality (Lemma 3, in the Appendix), we
have:
P (|θt − q| > ǫt | Q) ≤ 2 exp(−2tǫ2t ), (16)
where ǫt > 0 and P (|θt − q| > ǫt | Q) denotes the probability
that θt (which is random) is very far away from q (which is
fixed). Now set: ǫt =
√
ln(2/δ)
2t as in Algorithm 1. Then, since
equation 16 holds for any ǫt > 0, we get that the probability
of keeping a malicious node i ∈ Q in the network is at most
δ: P
(
|θt − q| >
√
ln(2/δ)
2t | Q
)
< δ. Thus, we have: E[L |
Q] = E[N | Q] · ℓQ =
∑∞
t=0 P(N = t | Q) · t · ℓQ ≤
ℓQ
∑∞
t=0 δ
t−1 · t = ℓQ(1−δ)2
(Proof of Lemma 2): We denote by N the time-step at
which E removes node i from the network. Then, the function
g : N2 → R that gives us the gain for each node i is defined
as: g(n, h) , min{n, h} · gU where h ∈ H and n ∈ N . Since
the node i under consideration is honest, i.e. i ∈ U , we have
E[xi,t | U ] = u. Without loss of generality we assume that:
u = q+∆, where ∆ > 0. So we only need P(θt−q < ǫt | U).
Since q = u−∆ from the Hoeffding inequality (Lemma 3, in
the Appendix), we have:
P(N = t | U) ≤ P(N ≤ t) ≤ P(θt − u < ǫt −∆ | U)
≤ exp(−2 · t(ǫt −∆)2)
where ∆− ǫt > 0. It holds that:
E[G | U , N = n] =
∞∑
n=0
P(H = h | U , N = n)E[G | U , N = n,H = h] (17)
9But it holds that: E[G | U , N = n,H ] = g(n, h) and since
h ∈ H and n ∈ N are independent we have: P(H = h |
U , N = n) = P(H = h | U). Thus,
E[G | U , N = n] =
∞∑
h=0
P(H = h | U) · g(n, h) =
∑
h=0
P(H = h | U)min{n, h} · gU =
gU ·
{ n−1∑
h=0
P(H = h | U) · h+
∞∑
h=n
P(H = h | U) · n
}
(18)
The expected loss is given by subtracting from the expected
gain of the oracle policy, when E never removes the node from
the network (i.e. N =∞), the expected gain when E removes
the node at the time-step N = n. Thus, it holds:
E[L | U , N = n] = E[G | U , N =∞]− E[G | U , N = n] =
lim
n→∞
(E[G | U , N = n])− E[G | U , N = n] =
gU
∞∑
h=0
P(H = h)h− gU
{ n−1∑
h=0
P(H = h)h+
∞∑
h=n
P(H = h)n
}
= gU
{ ∞∑
h=n
P(H = h)h−
∞∑
h=n
P(H = h)n
}
(19)
Since, by definition P(H = h + 1 | H > h) = λ, we have
P(H = h) = (1 − λ)h−1λ. Consequently,
E[L | U , N = n] =gUλ
( ∞∑
h=n
(1− λ)h−1h−
∞∑
h=n
(1− λ)h−1n
)
=gU
(1 − λ)n
λ
(20)
Thus, we have: E[L | U ] =∑∞t=0 P(N = t | U)E[L|N = t]
≤∑∞t=0 exp(−2 · t · (ǫt−∆)2) · gU (1−λ)tλ Since the algorithm
uses ǫt =
∆√
t
, we have:
E[L | U ] ≤gU
λ
∞∑
t=0
exp
(
−2 · t
[
∆√
t
−∆
]2)
(1− λ)t
=
gU
λ
∞∑
t=0
exp
(
−2∆2(
√
t− 1)2
)
(1− λ)t
≤ gU
λ
∞∑
t=0
exp

−2∆2
[
√
t−
√
t
2
]2 (1− λ)t
=
gU
λ
∞∑
t=0
[
exp
(
−∆
2
2
)
(1− λ)
]t
=
gU[
1− exp (−∆22 ) (1− λ)] λ ≤
gU (∆2 + 2)
λ(∆2 + 2λ)
where t ≥ 2.
Definition 1 (Bernoulli distribution): If X1, . . . , Xn are in-
dependent Bernoulli random variables with Xk ∈ {0, 1} and
P(Xk = 1) = µ for all k, then
P
(
n∑
k=1
Xk ≥ u
)
=
u∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
µk(1− µ)n−k. (21)
Lemma 3 (Hoeffding): For independent random variables
X1, . . . , Xn such that Xi ∈ [ai, bi], with µi , EXi and t > 0:
P
(
n∑
i=1
Xi ≥
n∑
i=1
µi + nt
)
≤ exp
(
− 2n
2t2∑n
i=1(bi − ai)2
)
.
The same in equality holds for
∑n
i=1Xi ≤
∑n
i=1 µi − nt.
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